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Abstract
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, is rapidly subsuming much of
China's political and economic involvement abroad. As a far-reaching infrastructure
development and investment strategy, officially involving more than 130 countries,
the expansion of the BRI raises important questions about its environmental impacts
and its implications for environmental governance. This article examines how China
is actively and rapidly developing an institutional architecture for its envisioned
“green BRI,” considering the key actors, policies, and initiatives involved in the envi-
ronmental governance of the BRI. We find that the current institutional architecture
of the “green BRI” relies on voluntary corporate self-governance and a multitude of
international and transnational sustainability initiatives. The effectiveness of the envi-
ronmental governance of the BRI not only hinges on China's priorities and commit-
ments, but also on the political willingness and capacity of BRI partner countries to
maintain, implement, and enforce stringent environmental laws and regulations. We
conclude by outlining several environmental governance challenges and an agenda
for future research.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) to improve regional and trans-continental cooperation
and connectivity through investments, trade, and infrastructure pro-
jects. Under the umbrella of the BRI, China invests in transport and
energy infrastructure, such as railways, roads, ports, airports and pipe-
lines across the Eurasian, Asian, and African continents via the land-
based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “twenty-first century Mari-
time Silk Road.” The BRI is intended to extend beyond infrastructure
construction to encompass policy coordination, trade facilitation,
financial integration, and cultural and scientific exchange
(NDRC, 2015). Chinese policy banks and state-owned commercial
banks provide the largest sources of funding for the BRI, totaling at
least USD 500 billion by 2019, while additional investments are made
by Chinese companies, non-Chinese companies and banks, interna-
tional organizations, and governments of partner countries (European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2020).
Today, most social or economic cooperation agreements, plans,
or projects between China and foreign countries are framed as BRI-
related activities (Zhang, 2018). As of January 2020, the Chinese gov-
ernment had signed 200 cooperation documents with 138 countries
and 30 international organizations (Figure 1). Since the BRI is still
expanding, and an official registry of all BRI projects does not exist, it
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remains challenging to pinpoint the geographical scope and full num-
ber of BRI projects. Even countries that have not signed bilateral
cooperation documents on jointly building the BRI with China
(Figure 1) may be considered part of the BRI, such as Turkmenistan
(Xinhua, 2017c).
Given the unprecedented dimension of this initiative, scholars
and civil society organizations have voiced concerns about its actual
and potential negative environmental impacts (Ascens~ao et al., 2018;
Teo et al., 2019; Tracy, Shvarts, Simonov, & Babenko, 2017;
WWF, 2017). Protecting the environment while fostering economic
development under the BRI will be challenging, as the initiative tra-
verses a diverse range of fragile environments. Biophysical conditions
range from forests and steppes in Russia, to ice, snow, and permafrost
across the Tibetan Plateau, and tropical rainforests in Malaysia. Partly
in response to growing international criticism, several Chinese minis-
tries collectively issued policies on the “green Belt and Road” or
“green Silk Road”1 (Belt and Road Portal, 2017a, 2017b) to respond
“to the international trend of seeking green, low-carbon and circular
development” (Belt and Road Portal, 2017a, section 1.2). After
launching high-level domestic policy commitments to achieving an
“ecological civilization,”2 China is now increasingly making efforts to
mainstream this policy paradigm in its international activities (Belt and
Road Portal, 2017a).
To date, most research on the BRI has focused on geopolitical
and geo-economic impacts, centering on the question of interna-
tional order. The BRI is seen as part of a new phase of globalization
in which China plays a more active role (Gao, 2018; Kolosov
et al., 2017; Liu & Dunford, 2016). Scholars widely agree that the
BRI, if implemented as planned, will rewrite the current geopolitical
landscape (Beeson, 2018; Du, 2016; Fallon, 2015; Minghao, 2016).
In contrast, environmental issues have attracted less attention, and
research on the environmental governance challenges and institu-
tional structures arising as part of the “green BRI” remains sparse
(Hughes et al., 2020).
This article provides an initial assessment of the emerging envi-
ronmental governance architecture of the BRI, which comprises
organizations, regimes, and other forms or norms, principles, regula-
tions and decision-making procedures (Biermann, Pattberg, van
Asselt, & Zelli, 2009). We address the question of how Chinese, BRI-
host country, and international and transnational institutions con-
tribute to the environmental governance of the BRI. Since the BRI is
governed by multiple independent but interacting governance
arrangements, it is crucial to examine the governance architecture of
the BRI rather than the design and effectiveness of individual institu-
tions. In this we follow Dauvergne and Clapp (2016), who argue that
global environmental governance scholarship focuses too narrowly
on specific existing international governance schemes and may
therefore miss important developments concerning new environ-
mental issues that are not yet the subject of sophisticated gover-
nance frameworks. We restrict this analysis to formal institutions;
thus, we do not consider the role of social norms or implicit rules.
Our insights are drawn from official government documents, publi-
shed peer-reviewed literature, media articles, reports, and working
papers published in English. Even though the use of Chinese sources
could have improved this work, all of the cited BRI-specific policy
documents are available in English. The BRI is a young, fast-
developing initiative that requires more empirical and joint research
effort by both Chinese and non-Chinese scholars.
After outlining the major environmental risks and opportunities of
the BRI, we present the emerging environmental governance architec-
ture of the BRI. Then, we discuss three key governance challenges,
and the role of the BRI in global environmental governance. Finally,
F IGURE 1 Countries that have signed cooperation documents with China to jointly build the Belt and Road. Data retrieved from Belt and
Road Portal (2019) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
2 COENEN ET AL.
we outline a future research agenda for analyzing environmental gov-
ernance of the BRI.
2 | ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES OF THE BRI
There are two overarching perspectives on the prospects of the BRI
to contribute to sustainable development. From one point of view,
scholars, policy analysists, and politicians see the BRI as an opportu-
nity for sustainable development (Dong, Yang, & Li, 2018; Jin, 2018;
UNDP & CCIEE, 2017). At the first BRI Forum in 2017, the Chinese
President Xi Jinping emphasized “efforts should be made to
strengthen cooperation in ecological and environmental protection
and build a sound ecosystem so as to realize the goals set by the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (Xinhua, 2017a). Green
trade (i.e., cap and trade mechanisms), finance and investment, as
well as green technology and innovation, are seen as the key mecha-
nisms through which the BRI can accelerate progress in achieving
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNDP & CCIEE, 2017).
Chinese financial institutions could provide financial resources to
BRI countries to implement their Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions under the Paris Agreement (Zhou, Gilbert, Wang, Muñoz
Cabré, & Gallagher, 2018). As the world's largest supplier of renew-
able energy equipment, China could help to unlock the huge renew-
able energy potential of BRI countries (Andrews-Speed &
Zhang, 2018; Chen et al., 2019), and share its knowledge and exper-
tise on how to adjust policy targets, change subsidy structures, and
reduce power wastage (Eyler, 2019). The Digital Silk Road,3 which
aims, for example, to build a network for collecting and sharing Earth
observation data, could improve environmental monitoring and sup-
port sound policy-making in BRI countries (Guo et al., 2018). From
this perspective, the BRI could thus contribute to the Paris Agree-
ment and the SDGs, but concrete empirical demonstrations have not
yet been explored.
From another point of view, observers are concerned about the
environmental risks that the BRI poses. Infrastructure development,
trade, and investments under the BRI could bring unprecedented neg-
ative environmental impacts that may outweigh its economic benefits
(Li, Qian, & Zhou, 2017). The potential impacts of the BRI are mani-
fold. Infrastructure projects have direct effects on ecosystems and
wildlife, but also indirect effects such as attracting logging, poaching,
and settlement (Teo et al., 2019), contributing to deforestation and
other land use changes (Losos, Pfaff, Olander, Mason, &
Morgan, 2019). The BRI may drive biodiversity loss due to fragmenta-
tion and degradation of habitats (Ascens~ao et al., 2018; Lechner,
Chan, & Campos-Arceiz, 2018; WWF, 2017), and increase greenhouse
gas emissions due to the construction and maintenance of transporta-
tion infrastructure and further Chinese investment in coal-fired power
plants (Zhang, Liu, Zheng, & Xue, 2017; Zhou et al., 2018). It could
also accelerate extraction of natural resources, such as water, sand,
and ferrous metal ores in countries along the BRI (Howard &
Howard, 2016; Hughes, 2019; Suocheng et al., 2017). These
environmental problems are neither exhaustive nor exclusive to the
BRI, but without effective environmental governance, infrastructure
investments and other development projects can cause direct and
indirect environmental impacts.
The difficulty of defining the scope and size of the BRI and its
related activities makes it challenging to draw clear, evidence-based
conclusions about the environmental effects of the BRI on a global
scale. According to research by the Mercator Institute for China Studies
(MERICS), about two-thirds of Chinese spending on completed BRI pro-
jects was directed at the energy sector (more than USD 50 billion), of
which more than USD 20 billion were invested in renewable energy
projects, followed by fossil-fuel energy generation projects (about USD
15 billion) and grid investments (about USD 12 billion). Several large
hydropower projects contribute to higher overall investments in renew-
ables. Additionally, USD 15 billion were spent on transport projects and
USD 10 billion on the Digital Silk Road (Eder & Mardell, 2019).
In Figures 2 and 3, we analyze 374 BRI projects across 51 coun-
tries, which have been identified by the Reconnecting Asia Database
(CSIS, 2020). We find that most BRI projects concern the transport
sector (215 projects), followed by the energy sector (159 projects).
Despite China's leadership in renewable energy manufacturing and
deployment (Andrews-Speed & Zhang, 2018), the majority of energy
projects are still related to fossil-fuels. Although the two figures pro-
vide only a snapshot of all BRI projects and deviate from the research
results by MERICS, they contribute towards clarifying the scope of
the BRI, given the paucity of official information. The funding for the
300 projects for which data is available amounts to about USD 500 bil-
lion (Figure 3). Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, and Cambodia
are the top five recipients of BRI project funding. The overall highest
costs are reported for BRI projects in Pakistan, China, Russia,
Bangladesh, and Belarus.
3 | ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
ARCHITECTURE OF THE BRI
China's endeavor to build hard infrastructure across the world is
accompanied by efforts to develop the necessary soft infrastructure
such as the “green BRI,” to provide governance structures to coordi-
nate and implement BRI activities. Governance implies finding collec-
tive solutions to problems that involve multiple actors and are too
complex to be addressed by individuals, groups of individuals, or non-
state actors (Young et al., 2015). Kooiman (1993) defines governance
as the patterns that emerge from all those activities of social, political,
and administrative actors to guide, steer, control, and manage socie-
ties. Research on environmental governance is concerned with “the
set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through
which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes”
(Lemos & Agrawal, 2006, p. 298).
In our analysis of the environmental governance architecture of
the BRI, we focus on institutions, defined as “persistent and con-
nected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioral roles, con-
strain activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane, 1989, p. 3). The
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concept of governance architecture allows us to analyze an issue area,
which is regulated by more than one institution. All governance archi-
tectures are fragmented to some degree because they consist of dif-
ferent parts that are rarely ever fully interlinked or integrated
(Biermann et al., 2009). This is clearly applicable to the “green BRI”, as
it is governed by multiple independent public and private governance
institutions from China, BRI host countries, and the international
realm. While some scholars rely on the notion of fragmentation to
analyze these complex governance systems (Biermann et al., 2009),
others adopt the perspective of polycentricity, emphasizing the
F IGURE 2 Type of Belt and Road Initiative projects in 51 countries (n = 374). Transport (blue), fossil-fuel energy (yellow), renewable energy
(green), other energy (orange) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 3 Reported costs (in USD billion) of Belt and Road Initiative projects (n = 300). Transport (blue), fossil-fuel energy (yellow),
renewable energy (green), other energy (orange) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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system's ability to self-organize (Ostrom, 2005). Focusing on the
wider governance architecture helps keep us alert to overarching
trends in environmental governance, such as the emergence of new
multi-stakeholder modes of governance, and their more or less inte-
grated coexistence with traditional forms of state-based governance
(Cashore, 2002; Folke et al., 2019; Newell, Pattberg, &
Schroeder, 2012), as well as interactions of multiple institutions across
horizontal and vertical governance levels (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009;
Schreurs, 2017). Increasing long-distance flows of traded goods, capi-
tal, and foreign direct investment (FDI) pose governance challenges
that are difficult for national public authorities to address alone, but
require interstate collaboration and actions by civil society and market
actors (Challies, Newig, & Lenschow, 2019). In our analysis, we draw
on these theoretical perspectives in assessing the environmental gov-
ernance of the BRI by considering the role of non-environmental insti-
tutions such as banks, the interactions between the BRI institutions
and established international governance institutions, and the use of
non-mandatory policy instruments.
3.1 | Chinese institutions governing the
“‘Green BRI”
The formulation and implementation of BRI activities take place
across multiple actors and multiple levels, including various Chinese
government ministries and organizations under the State Council
(Figure 4), banking institutions, as well as state-owned and private
corporate actors.
China has developed a complex institutional framework for envi-
ronmental protection in the context of the BRI, which is composed of
BRI-specific and BRI-related policies. In addition to the official guide-
lines of government authorities, industrial associations and business
networks have issued environmental guidelines, many of which are
based on international guidelines developed by the organisation for
economic co-operation and development or United Nations
(UN) (Table 1). Unlike enforceable laws and regulations, these policies
and guidelines are voluntary, primarily outlining aspirational goals and
visions. China proactively engages with stakeholders from BRI host
countries using soft law, that is, nearly all the sources of BRI-specific
rules are legally non-binding informal documents rather than formal
treaties (Wang, 2019). The two core policy documents on the BRI are
the “Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt
and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and the “Vision for Maritime
Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative,” published in 2015
and 2017, respectively (NDRC, 2015; Xinhua, 2017b). Both vision
documents state that the BRI should increase exchange and coopera-
tion on ecological protection, but provide no regulatory provisions for
achieving these aspirations.
The most relevant policies on environmental governance of the
BRI are the “Guidance on promoting a green Belt and Road” and the
F IGURE 4 Key Chinese governance entities involved in the environmental governance of the Belt and Road Initiative (non-exhaustive).
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019); National People's Congress Observer (2018), Ren, Zhang, Zhu, and Zhang (2017), Rolland (2018),
Yu (2018)
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“The Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan”.
They promote a very strong pro-environmental narrative on the BRI,
underscoring that projects should support green and low-carbon
development, protect biodiversity, and address climate change. China
thus projects itself through these policies as a key supporter of global
environmental governance. The policies explicitly state that “promot-
ing the green Belt and Road is an essential effort to participate in
global environmental governance” (Belt and Road Portal, 2017a,
section 1.2), and repeatedly emphasize the goal of aligning the “green
BRI” with the most prominent global sustainability agenda—the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Cooperation Plan lists
25 specific projects, without providing additional detail beyond pro-
ject names (Belt and Road Portal, 2017b). While several projects have
already been launched (see Appendix S1), others do not seem to have
started yet, like the “Eco-Label Mutual Recognition” or the “Biodiver-
sity Conservation Corridor Demonstration” projects. The scheduled
targets are to integrate the concept of “ecological civilization” into the
BRI by 2025, and to promote cooperation on environmental protec-
tion “with higher standards and at deeper levels” to accomplish the
SDGs by 2030 (Belt and Road Portal, 2017b, section 2.3).
A key feature of these two policies is that they demonstrate
China's push for corporate environmental governance under the BRI.
Both indicate the roles and responsibilities of different governance
actors: The role of the state is to provide guidance and to establish
cooperation platforms for communication, information support, tech-
nology transfer, and big data. Corporations are expected to be the
main players in the environmental governance of the BRI and to vol-
untarily bear environmental and social responsibilities. They are urged
TABLE 1 Key policies and guidelines governing the environmental aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A short description of all
documents can be found in the Appendix S1. The table includes policies and guidelines that do not refer explicitly to the BRI, but are related to
the BRI by governing environmental dimensions of Chinese trade and investment. A full overview of regulations governing Chinese outward
foreign direct investment (FDI) can be found in Gallagher and Qi (2018)
Scope Title Year
Policies and guidelines issued by government authorities
BRI-specific Visions and actions on jointly building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st century Maritime Silk
Road
2015
Building the belt and road: Concepts, practices and China's contributions 2017
Guidance on promoting a green belt and road 2017
Vision for maritime cooperation under the belt and road initiative 2017
The belt and road ecological and environmental cooperation plan 2017
Vision and actions on agriculture cooperation in jointly building silk road Economic Belt and
21st century maritime silk road
2017
Vision and actions on energy cooperation in jointly building silk road Economic Belt and 21st
century Maritime Silk Road
2017
BRI-related A guide on sustainable overseas Silviculture by Chinese enterprises 2007
A guide on sustainable overseas forests management and utilization by Chinese enterprises 2009
Green credit guidelines 2012
Guidelines on environmental protection for overseas investment and cooperation 2013
Guidelines for establishing the green financial system 2016
Regulations on outbound investment and business activities of private enterprises 2017
China banking regulatory commission on the standardization of banking service enterprises
going abroad: Guide to strengthen risk prevention and control
2017
Measures for the management outbound investment regulations 2017
A guide on sustainable overseas trade and Investment of Forest Products by Chinese
enterprises
In progress
Guidelines issued by industry associations
BRI-related Guide on Social Responsibility for Chinese International Contractors (2012), Operational
Manual for the Guide on Social Responsibility for Chinese International Contractors (2018)
2012, 2018
Guidelines for social responsibility in outbound mining investments 2015
Chinese due diligence guidelines for responsible mineral supply chains 2016
Environmental risk management for China's overseas investment guidelines 2017
Guidelines of sustainable infrastructure for Chinese international contractors 2017
The guidelines on China's sustainable agricultural overseas investment 2018
Guide for overseas investment and production of sustainable palm oil by Chinese enterprises In progress
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to observe both international regulations, policies, and standards and
those of the host countries (Belt and Road Portal, 2017a). Corpora-
tions should adhere to guidelines on “green corporate behavior”
issued by various ministries, strengthen environmental management,
and disclose environmental information (Belt and Road Portal, 2017b).
The main mechanism to achieve the sustainability objectives of the
BRI is cooperation, “characterized by governance guidance, business
commitment, and social participation” (Belt and Road Portal, 2017b,
section 2.2).
In addition to the BRI-specific policy documents, China has
established a wider governance structure to guide and supervise Chi-
nese overseas investments. Many policies governing the conduct of
and reporting by state-owned and private Chinese corporations oper-
ating overseas predate the BRI. Growing concerns about the environ-
mental practices of Chinese companies operating abroad have led the
Chinese government to issue a number of policies and initiatives, call-
ing for compliance with host countries' laws and regulations. To date,
no formal law regulating environmental matters in Chinese overseas
investments exists (Gallagher & Qi, 2018). Several government agen-
cies have issued policy guidelines that set out voluntary measures for
environmental protection (Table 1). For instance, the “Guidelines on
Environmental Protection in Overseas Investment and Cooperation”
encourage—but do not require—Chinese companies operating over-
seas to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIA)
(MOFCOM & MEP, 2013). In contrast, within China, EIAs have been
legally required since 2003 for all construction projects or plans with
potential environmental impacts (National People's Congress, 2003).
Thus, while companies can be held accountable for their potential
impacts within China, they will not be legally sanctioned by the Chi-
nese government for operations abroad.
Furthermore, financial institutions have substantial leverage with
companies and governance actors by defining socioeconomic condi-
tions for project approval and financing (Brombal, 2018). China has
made efforts to establish a green banking system. The “Green Credit
Guidelines”, issued in 2012, are the most important Chinese regula-
tions regarding sustainable banking practices. The guidelines encour-
age banking institutions to promote green credit and to effectively
identify, measure, monitor, and control environmental and social risks
associated with their credit activities. Overseas projects to which
credit is granted should abide by applicable laws and regulations on
environmental protection in the country where the project is located,
and follow relevant international practices or standards (CBRC, 2012).
The 2016 “Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System”
signal China's commitment to green finance. For example, the largest
lenders for BRI projects, the Chinese policy banks, have developed
environmental and social safeguards (Figure 4). Other important finan-
ciers of the BRI are multilateral development banks such as the Asian
Investment and Infrastructure Bank and the New Development Bank,
which adopted Environmental and Social Frameworks in 2016 (Losos
et al., 2019).
Overall, all identified BRI-specific and BRI-related environmental
rules are legally non-binding. Gallagher and Qi (2018) conclude that
even though the governance system for overseas investments has
matured, the policies governing the environmental impacts of Chinese
overseas investments remain relatively weak, mostly voluntary in
nature, and inconsistent with the policies that govern domestic invest-
ments. The Chinese government has incorporated green strategies
into the BRI, but so far only in aspirational terms. China has a growing
collection of BRI guidelines, but they lack essential details regarding
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement (Losos et al., 2019). A
report by the Asia Society Policy Institute highlights a disconnect
between China's proclamations on implementing a “green BRI,” and
actual environmental practices on the ground (Russel & Berger, 2019).
In the absence of financial or legal sanctions for non-compliance, both
public authorities and civil society actors can potentially engage in
“naming and shaming” to hold companies accountable to their volun-
tary commitments (van Erp, 2008). Domestically, this mechanism is
increasingly being employed in China as polluting industries are publi-
cized in an effort to shame companies into action, and citizens are
expected to assist by reporting violations (Schreurs, 2017). Yet, citi-
zens' awareness of and interest in environmentally or socially harmful
behavior of companies in distant countries is arguably lower com-
pared with their interest in domestic misbehavior. Therefore, transna-
tional advocacy networks and strong civil society organizations in BRI
host countries are important actors, which could employ this extrale-
gal social mechanism to hold foreign companies accountable.
3.2 | International and transnational environmental
institutions governing the BRI
Apart from formal policies and guidelines, China is also actively devel-
oping an international and transnational governance structure for the
“green BRI.” The Chinese government pursues a dual-track approach
in this regard. On the one hand, China aims to build new environmen-
tal protection cooperation networks, and on the other hand, it also
plans to make use of existing bilateral and multilateral international
cooperation mechanisms, such as China-ASEAN, the Euro-Asia Eco-
nomic Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation (Belt and Road Portal, 2017a), as well as the 17
+ 1 (formerly 16 + 1) cooperation framework between China and
17 Central and Eastern European Countries.
First, China seeks recognition for the BRI from international
organizations, particularly the UN, in order to gain some external
legitimacy for its mega-project. More than 25 UN agencies have
signed cooperation agreements with the Chinese government on the
BRI (UN Environment Programme [UNEP], n.d.), and around 20 high-
level UN officials, including the UN Secretary-General, attended the
second Belt and Road Forum in 2019 (Rosellini, 2019). According to
the Chinese Minister of Ecology and Environment, China has
strengthened several bilateral and multilateral environmental coop-
eration mechanisms under the umbrella of the BRI. The Lancang-
Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center, the China–Cambodia
Environmental Cooperation Center, and the China–Laos Environ-
mental Cooperation Office have been opened in recent years, while
the China–Africa Environmental Cooperation Center is in planning
COENEN ET AL. 7
(Li, 2019). The Green Silk Road Envoys Program, a training program
for environmental officials, is a prime example of how the Chinese
government builds the “green BRI” upon existing environmental gov-
ernance institutions. This flagship project, launched in 2011 and car-
ried out by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), trained
more than 1,000 environmental officials, technical personnel, and
scholars from more than 20 countries on topics such as green eco-
nomic policies and environmental law enforcement (Kou, 2019).
China continues to implement the program as part of the “green
BRI” and aims to train another 1,500 environmental officials over the
next 3 years (Benson Wahlén, 2019). Additionally, the Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences has developed research institutes to facilitate
research and collaboration and initiated other BRI-related training
and research projects, most notably the Alliance of International Sci-
ence Organizations of the BRI region.
Second, the government of China initiates new cooperation plat-
forms for the “green BRI,” often in collaboration with international
governmental or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (see Appen-
dix S1). A paramount example is the “International Coalition for Green
Development on the Belt and Road” (BRIGC), which was jointly initi-
ated by the MEE and international partners, first and foremost the
UNEP (Nakano, 2019). President Xi proposed the Coalition himself
during the opening of the first Belt and Road Forum in 2017, showing
that the Coalition receives support from the highest political levels
(Xinhua, 2017a). As of August 26, 2019 national environmental minis-
tries, eight intergovernmental organizations, 68 NGOs, and 30 corpo-
rations had joined the Coalition, comprising a total of 132 members
(BRIGC, 2019). The BRIGC aims to provide guidance, advice, and
financial support to its partners to make progress toward achieving
the SDGs and the Paris Agreement (BRIGC, 2019). The Coalition has
established 10 thematic issue areas covering a wide range of issues,
such as renewable energy, sustainable transportation, and biodiver-
sity. The emerging institutional structure of the BRIGC suggests that
it will potentially serve as an “orchestrator” of various public and pri-
vate governance activities, thus enacting a form of meta-governance
(Abbott, 2017).
Numerous international and transnational initiatives have been
established to govern environmental aspects of the BRI. Year 2019
alone saw the launch the Coalition of Sustainable Cities on the Belt
and Road, the Belt and Road South–South Cooperation Initiative on
Climate Change, the BRI Green Cooling Initiative, BRI Environmental
Big Data Platform, the BRI Green Lighting Initiative, and the BRI
Green Going-Out Initiative (see Appendix S1). Aside from launching
transnational initiatives, the Chinese government has also engaged in
bilateral environmental governance by signing Memoranda of Under-
standing (MoU) with international partners (see Appendix S1). These
actions underscore that China employs both classical environmental
governance instruments, such as intergovernmental MoUs, and new
governance arrangements, such as transnational cooperation initia-
tives. The Chinese government utilizes the “green BRI” as a platform
to actively raise its profile as a participant in global environmental
governance. The question arises whether the “green BRI” will inte-
grate with the existing global environmental governance landscape or
create entirely new governance structures. To date, there are strong
indicators that China has no intention of replacing the existing institu-
tions of global environmental governance through the “green BRI.”
Instead, China makes use of regional and multilateral cooperation
mechanisms and creates new environmental governance initiatives
under Chinese leadership, such as the BRIGC, in close collaboration
with international partners, including UN agencies. China's current
approach to the “green BRI” is characterized by a combination of rule-
taking and rule-making (Hamel, 1996). Since it remains unclear pre-
cisely what mandates and organizational structures the newly
established initiatives will assume, it is too early to assess whether
they will complement or undermine existing international environ-
mental governance institutions, or shift leadership in environmental
governance eastwards.
3.3 | Environmental governance in BRI partner
countries
Even though China has made efforts to strengthen and expand the
institutional architecture of the “green BRI,” a genuinely “green
BRI” will require effective environmental governance in BRI partner
countries. Since numerous Chinese policies strongly urge Chinese
companies to adhere to host countries' environmental laws and
regulations, the political willingness and institutional capacity of
BRI partner countries to formulate, implement, and enforce strict
environmental rules will significantly influence the environmental
sustainability of the BRI. Yet, low-income countries may prioritize
national economic development over environmental protection
and set weak environmental standards in order to attract FDI
(Gray, 2002). Especially countries with poor environmental gover-
nance records face high environmental risks under the BRI (Tracy
et al., 2017). Even if environmental regulations are present, they
may not be enforced. Brombal (2018) warns that many BRI projects
will be realized in countries where public participation and environ-
mental rights remain curtailed. For example, the use of robust and
effective EIAs and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) is
essential for identifying the direct and indirect effects of infra-
structure projects, and can potentially alter infrastructure designs
to avoid or mitigate impacts (Hughes et al., 2020; Lee &
George, 2013). BRI projects often involve complex contractual
arrangements with numerous parties including investors, finan-
ciers, consultants, construction contractors, operators, and govern-
ment authorities. Contracts can require that the countries hosting
BRI infrastructure projects undertake EIAs (Masood, 2019). Some
host countries, however, have little capacity to monitor and evalu-
ate such assessments. Comprehensive EIAs and SEAs take time to
develop and can result in changes to the original plan—all of which
can lead to project delays. China and BRI partner countries are
often reluctant to do anything that could slow projects' progress
(Masood, 2019).
Increasing trade and investment flows between BRI countries
may affect public and private environmental standards in multiple
8 COENEN ET AL.
ways (Table 2). The BRI may accelerate the “pollution haven effect”
by shifting polluting industries to less-regulated jurisdictions within
the BRI (Kolosov et al., 2017; Suocheng et al., 2017; Teo
et al., 2019). Since China is increasingly strengthening environmen-
tal protection (Schreurs, 2017), it is becoming attractive for Chi-
nese companies to migrate inefficient or resource-intensive
industries and technologies to BRI countries that do not follow suit
(Tracy et al., 2017). The “pollution haven effect” can lead to a “race
to the bottom” if governments lower environmental standards to
attract FDI (Table 2). Gamso (2018) shows that trade with China
generates a race to the bottom in the environmental policies in
countries of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. This effect is
moderated by the strength of governance institutions, in particular
bureaucratic capacity. Analyzing manufacturing industries exclu-
sively, Tian, Hu, Yin, Geng, and Bleischwitz (2019) find no evidence
so far that the BRI shifts pollution and resource exploitation from
China to other BRI countries. Morris (2018, p. 54) concludes that
effective coordination between BRI countries on legal and regula-
tory matters is needed to ensure that enterprises do not engage in
“jurisdiction shopping” and migrate their unsustainable activities
from one country to another. Many BRI partner countries rank low
on environmental performance, including top BRI investment
recipients like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Cambodia, highlighting
the risk that these countries become pollution havens (Figure 5).
On the contrary, the BRI may improve environmental standards
and regulation in BRI countries. If the BRI advances trade relations
with environmentally conscious consumer markets, it may stimulate
a “race to the top,” whereby exporter countries adopt higher envi-
ronmental standards to gain or maintain market access (Table 2).
According to Liu (2018), the Chinese government intends to use
the BRI to export China's environmental standards to countries
with lower development levels. For instance, the guidance docu-
ment on the “green BRI” outlines that China commits to include
environmental protection requirements in free trade agreements
(Belt and Road Portal, 2017a). In addition, China will recommend
that BRI partner countries include more eco-labeled products in
public procurement (Belt and Road Portal, 2017b). This indicates
that China is no longer ostensibly refraining from intervening in
host countries' internal affairs, at least when it comes to environ-
mental issues. Mol (2011) argues that China is slowly replacing its
strict principle of “non-interference” by securing popular support
through foreign assistance in non-economic sectors such as the
environment. In addition to public governmental actors, corporate
actors can encourage environmental sustainability in host countries
TABLE 2 Potential effects of trade and investment on public and private environmental standards
Adverse effects Beneficial effects
Investments Pollution haven effect: Pollution-intensive industries
migrate from countries with strict environmental
standards to countries with lax environmental
regulations (Zarsky, 1999).
This can lead to a race to the bottom (or Delaware effect,
see Vogel, 2009), whereby governments actively lower
environmental standards to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI), or a regulatory chill, when countries
refrain from enacting stricter regulations to not lose FDI
(Gray, 2002).
Pollution halo effect: Foreign companies use cleaner
environmental technology and improved
environmental management practices, which they
spread to their counterparts in the host country
(Zarsky, 1999).
This can lead to environmental leapfrogging as
developing countries need not pass through the dirty
stages of industrial growth experienced by developed
countries.
For example, as environmental regulations are becoming
stricter in China, heavy-polluting Chinese cement plants
relocate to Tajikistan (Teo et al., 2019). More than 100
new cement plants are planned along the Belt and Road
Initiative (Hughes, 2019).
For example, coal advocates argue that Chinese backed
coal power plants will bring environmental benefits to
host countries because they provide more efficient
technologies than these countries could otherwise
afford (Walker, 2016).
Trade Shanghai effect: Exporters apply lower environmental and
social standards if they shift from markets with
requirements for high standards to markets with lower
standard requirements or demands. A shift to new
export markets can undermine social and environmental
conditions in producer countries (adapted from Adolph,
Quince, & Prakash, 2017).
California effect (or race to the top): Governments
enact higher environmental standards to facilitate
exports to jurisdictions with higher regulatory
standards (Vogel, 2009). By adopting higher
standards, producers are able to continue selling to
higher regulated markets, which outweigh the
investment costs necessary for compliance. Arguably,
this effect also applies to companies selling their
products to environmentally conscious consumer
markets (see example below).
For example, a change in final market from the European
Union to China led to lower requirements for standards
being applied to the value chains of timber from Gabon
and cassava from Thailand (Kaplinsky, Terheggen, &
Tijaja, 2011).
For example, multinational firms that produce in China
and export a large proportion of their output to
developed countries are more likely to adopt ISO
14000 environmental management standards than
non-export-oriented firms (Christmann & Taylor,
2001).
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through the so-called “pollution halo effect” (Table 2). However, to
our knowledge, there are to date no empirical studies of how the
BRI affects the environmental governance of host countries and
vice versa.
As the BRI covers ever more European countries, it increasingly
intersects with environmental governance institutions of the
European Union (EU). A prime example is the Peljesac Bridge project
in Croatia, the first BRI project that is financed by the EU and built
by a Chinese consortium. In order to meet the strict environmental
regulations of the EU, the Chinese consortium set up a Safety and
Environmental Protection Department, introduced noise-canceling
technology to protect the marine environment, and collaborates
with local companies to meet EU environmental rules and regula-
tions (Xinhua, 2019). This example suggests that EU member coun-
tries engaging in BRI projects are less likely to engage a race to the
bottom than non-EU countries, as they are bound to comply with
supra-national EU environmental law. Even if BRI projects are
implemented outside the EU and funded by other financiers, interna-
tional organizations like the EU or the World Bank may exert some
limited, but not negligible influence on environmental governance by
requiring adherence to existing environmental standards as part of
their lending criteria (Lee & George, 2013) or by drawing on their
normative power towards BRI host countries. For instance,
European and international actors have voiced concerns about the
environmental effects of a BRI highway project in Montenegro
(European Parliament, 2018; Word Heritage Committee, 2019). The
engagement of third parties can help scrutinize contracts and
encourage host countries to negotiate better deals, as in the case of
a special economic zone in Myanmar, where a U.S. task force
facilitated renegotiations with China in an effort to protect the
human rights of local people (Hughes et al., 2020).
4 | GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES OF THE
“GREEN BRI”
In the few years since the inception of the BRI, the environmental
governance architecture of the “green BRI” has developed into a frag-
mented patchwork of national, regional, transnational, and interna-
tional institutions of various forms—initiatives, guidelines, agreements,
and programs. The Chinese government plays a key role in initiating
voluntary and cooperative programs and networks of public, private,
and civil society actors and institutions for the environmental gover-
nance of the BRI. Formally, the government of China does not take a
“command-and-control” approach, but rather provides incentives for
enterprises and banks to self-regulate. Responsibility for environmen-
tal governance is widely dispersed across multiple state agencies,
which explicitly request that corporations assume a key role. Overall,
the development of the institutional landscape for the “green BRI”
mirrors major trends in global environmental governance toward
increasing reliance on transnational multi-actor governance and the
use of soft law (Folke et al., 2019).
Despite the rapid proliferation of initiatives under the umbrella of
the “green BRI,” major challenges for environmental governance
remain. First, BRI-specific and -related policies are not stringent, but
based on voluntary and corporate self-regulatory instruments. China's
vision of a “green BRI” is unlikely to be realized in the absence of
stricter policies that set out concrete sets of actions. China has
F IGURE 5 Environmental performance of China and countries that have signed cooperation documents with China to jointly build the Belt
and Road. The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranks countries on 24 performance indicators, which indicate how close countries are to
established environmental policy goals (Wendling et al., 2018). While 83 BRI countries have a higher EPI than China (EPI 50.74), 50 BRI countries
rank lower than China. Data is not available for five BRI countries. The average EPI for BRI countries is 54.47 [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
10 COENEN ET AL.
outlined a detailed set of principles to govern the “green BRI,” but
unless these are further operationalized, they will likely be criticized
as mere window dressing, designed to improve China's international
image, rather than ensure environmental protection.
Second, another challenge for the environmental governance of
the BRI is to address telecouplings. Telecouplings arise when various
geographically distant human–environmental systems become
increasingly interconnected and interdependent due to accelerated
flows of capital, labor, energy, materials, and economic activities
across distances (Eakin, Rueda, & Mahanti, 2017; Friis et al., 2016;
Liu et al., 2013). There is growing recognition that activities in any
world region can have environmental impacts in other regions and
even the wider Earth system (Dietz, 2003; Kissinger, Rees, &
Timmer, 2011). Analyzing the BRI from a telecoupling perspective
helps in understanding and governing the interconnected socioeco-
nomic and environmental issues within and among BRI countries
(Yang et al., 2016).
Telecoupling shows that distant, seemingly unconnected,
human–environmental systems can become closely interdependent,
highlighting that (un)sustainability in one place is closely linked to
(un)sustainability other places. Policy leakage is a clear example.
Leakage occurs if environmental policies (e.g., in China) create indi-
rect impacts (e.g., in BRI-affected countries) that go against the
objectives of the policy, reducing the overall benefit of the interven-
tion (Bastos Lima, Persson, & Meyfroidt, 2019). Environmental gov-
ernance of the BRI needs to mitigate the risk that increasingly
stringent environmental policies in China create leakages to BRI
countries. If China wants to achieve its dual goal of sustaining eco-
nomic growth, while at the same time preserving its natural environ-
ment, the country will likely need to import more energy and natural
resources.4 Land-use leakage serves as an illustrative example. As
China has strengthened its afforestation and conservation policies
through a moratorium on commercial logging in domestic natural for-
ests, the BRI could help meet China's growing demand for timber
though additional imports from participating countries (Kolosov
et al., 2017). Since 1998, logging bans in China have led to increasing
timber imports from abroad, especially from Russia and Southeast
Asia (Laurance, 2008; Mayer, 2005). Simonov (2018) argues that the
China-Mongolia-Russia-Economic Corridor of the BRI could lead to
the reopening of a Sino-Russian border crossing, which would allow
for export of roundwood to China, likely contributing to deforesta-
tion in Russian border provinces in the future. Between 2013 and
2018, exports of forestry products from Russia to China grew by
11% (Chatham House, 2018).
The BRI will increase interdependencies between regions of dif-
ferent countries involved in the BRI through material and immaterial
flows. This highlights that there are limits to the ability of territorially
bounded national governance to address environmental impacts
resulting from changing policies, consumption patterns, or sourcing
practices in distant locations. In contrast to strictly global-scale prob-
lems, such as climate change, for which mitigation actions can take
place anywhere because the concentration of pollutants is evenly
spread, the environmental governance of telecouplings needs to be
targeted at specific flows and places (Newig, Lenschow, Challies,
Cotta, & Schilling-Vacaflor, 2018).
Third, we find a strong discourse on a “green BRI” at national
level. However, this does not necessarily mean that local governmen-
tal institutions, local state-owned, or private companies will adapt
their actions accordingly. China's local governments tend to lack moti-
vation and capacity for effective enforcement of national environmen-
tal regulations (Qi & Zhang, 2014). BRI projects involve many
different private and public actors, including contractors, developers,
consultants, financiers, and regulators, not only from China, but also
from host countries and international organizations. Therefore, the
Chinese government needs to link its pro-environmental narrative and
various recently established high-level initiatives across spatial and
jurisdictional scales to projects at the local level. As the BRI is
governed by multiple interacting governance arrangements, it needs
to bridge the social and institutional distance between actors and
institutions from China and BRI partner countries. Although countries
may be geographically close, they can be institutionally distant if they
share few governance arrangements, or socially distant if there are
few linkages of social networks, values, and knowledge between them
(Eakin et al., 2017). In terms of social distance, high communication
barriers and long-standing trust deficits between China and some BRI
countries create high transaction costs for environmental governance.
The legal and regulatory systems of countries along the BRI vary
widely, ranging from those which rest on religious teachings to those
with common law or civil law traditions. Chinese companies should
show awareness and concern for the sociopolitical climate and local
environmental laws and regulations of host countries where they
invest.
5 | CONCLUSION
The Chinese government is taking an active, yet soft approach to the
environmental governance of the BRI. China is actively and rapidly
developing an institutional architecture for the “green BRI” based on
aspirational vision statements and voluntary instruments at the
national, international, and transnational level. This underlines China's
ambitions to seek a more influential role in global environmental gov-
ernance. The Chinese government has increasingly sought to
strengthen multi-actor governance by involving a number of private
and international actors in the strongly state-driven institution-
building process of the “green BRI.” Companies are explicitly expected
to play a leading role in realizing the government's vision of a “green
BRI.” China seeks to integrate its “ecological civilization” policy para-
digm into the BRI, but it remains to be seen whether the country man-
ages to further move its ambitions from words to actions.
China uses the BRI as a platform to present itself as a rule-taker
and rule-maker in global environmental governance as it mobilizes
existing environmental governance institutions and builds new ones.
However, the environmental sustainability of the BRI does not only
hinge on the environmental governance efforts of Chinese actors, but
notably on the effective implementation, monitoring, and
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enforcement of environmental laws and regulations in BRI host coun-
tries. Since China strongly encourages its enterprises and financial
institutions to comply with the laws in the countries where BRI pro-
jects are implemented, BRI host countries have substantial leverage
on how the sustainability of the BRI unfolds. The governance capacity
and political willingness of BRI host countries to safeguard the natural
environment will strongly influence the environmental performance of
the BRI. Countries with low environmental performance, such as
Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Cambodia, are arguably at greater risk to
become pollution havens.
Several key research questions regarding the environmental gov-
ernance of the BRI remain. Due to the vague and expanding size of
the BRI and associated enormous data requirements, the scientific
community will face considerable methodological challenges in mov-
ing from outlining potential environmental effects of the BRI toward
developing comprehensive studies of its actual global environmental
impacts in the coming years. Another important task for future
research is to empirically investigate whether and how China's “green
BRI” influences environmental governance in BRI countries. Will the
BRI drive a race to the bottom among partner countries in search of
investment or will China actually become an exporter of stricter envi-
ronmental regulations and norms? Does the BRI lead to environmental
policy convergence? Will environmental standards be subject to
Shanghai or California effects?
Moreover, it is necessary to better understand how countries
or groups of countries that do not formally take part in the BRI,
such as the EU or the United States, can affect the sustainability of
the BRI. Consumption in the United States and the EU is responsi-
ble for 30% of the carbon emissions in 65 BRI countries through
embodied carbon flows (Han, Yao, Liu, & Dunford, 2018). Thus,
researchers should investigate how the newly established BRI insti-
tutions can govern the environmental effects of telecoupled com-
modity and resource flows and their interplay with existing global
governance arrangements. Applying the telecoupling framework to
trade or investment flows associated with the BRI may be a fruitful
approach to examining sustainability challenges and opportunities
that transcend national borders. Additionally, our work on the envi-
ronmental governance architecture of the BRI provides a basis from
which to explore the roles of particular actors and the effectiveness
of specific governance arrangements. Finally, a core question for
political scientists will be how the emerging environmental gover-
nance architecture intersects with inter- and intra-state power rela-
tions and national interests. Since China is not a unitary actor, but a
collection of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities,
future studies could explore the role of subnational governance
institutions in the context of the “green BRI.” The formidable chal-
lenge regarding the sustainability of the BRI is to govern a wide
variety of environmental issues that transcend spatial and jurisdic-
tional scales, and involve multiple institutions, actors, and sectors.
Orchestrating the various environmental governance efforts out-
lined in this article and ensuring their effectiveness will be a core
task on the long road ahead.
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1Subsequently referred to as “green BRI”.
2The aim of developing an “ecological civilization” is to promote greater
conservation of natural resources, low carbon development, greater
recycling of resources, and cultivation of an ecological culture. This policy
paradigm calls for reductions in carbon intensity and water consumption,
improved water quality and biodiversity protection, sound land use and
development, and greening of the industrial structure and urban areas
(Schreurs, 2017).
3The Digital Silk Road (also referred to as “online Silk Road” or “informa-
tion Silk Road”) refers to the goal of improving digital connections along
the BRI by building bilateral cable networks, transcontinental submarine
cable projects, and improving satellite passageways (Shen, 2018).
4This process is of course not unique to China's development path. West-
ern countries also achieved their ecological modernization partly through
displacement of extractive and polluting industries and the outsourcing of
production to less industrialized countries.
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